Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Widodo

 

Photo source: The New York Times

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

Indonesia’s foreign policy has undergone two major shifts in recent decades. The first concerns priorities. Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sought to strengthen Indonesia’s democracy and restore its standing in international institutions. He branded the country as ‘a model for Muslim democracy’ and launched the Bali Democracy Forum in 2008, which Lina Alexandra and Tobias Basuki noted was part of his broader effort to project Indonesia’s soft power through democracy and human rights. Yudhoyono’s approach was rooted in building legitimacy for Indonesia as a democratic actor in Asia and beyond.

President Joko Widodo, by contrast, has pursued different priorities. His foreign policy has been closely tied to Indonesia’s ambitious development agenda, including relocating the capital to Nusantara, expanding infrastructure, and boosting connectivity projects in eastern Indonesia. Scholars such as Mohamad Rosyidin have observed that Widodo’s foreign policy treats democracy less as an end in itself and more as a tool to support economic development. Widodo has consistently emphasised that foreign policy should deliver tangible benefits for Indonesians, aligning diplomacy with domestic growth.

The second shift relates to engagement with great powers, particularly China and the United States. Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia engaged more closely with Washington and other members of the liberal international order. Widodo, however, has taken a more critical stance toward the US, often highlighting the failure of Western countries to reduce global inequalities or deliver development to the Global South. Melinda Martinus at the ISEAS‑Yusof Ishak Institute noted that Jokowi’s administration deliberately distanced itself from traditional Western alliances, strengthening ties with China and other non‑Western partners to secure economic benefits. Indonesia has become the largest recipient of Belt and Road Initiative projects in Southeast Asia, with Chinese funding for the Jakarta‑Bandung high‑speed rail and investments in the new capital city, as reported by The Conversation and CDR News.

Indonesia’s democratic initiatives have nevertheless found support within ASEAN. Yudhoyono’s government played a central role in drafting the ASEAN Charter, embedding democracy and human rights as principles. Indonesia also led the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. More recently, Widodo has pushed ASEAN to implement its five‑point consensus on Myanmar. In January 2023, Jokowi reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to the consensus, stressing that ASEAN must act to halt violence and restore dialogue, as reported by the Indonesian Cabinet Secretariat. Yet ASEAN’s support for democracy at the regional level does not mean its members embrace democratic reforms at home. Indonesia’s approach has been careful not to interfere in the sovereignty of other states, unlike Western democracy promotion, which often uses economic or security instruments. This respect for sovereignty has ensured regional backing for Indonesia’s vision of democracy in the regional and global order.

The biggest challenge for Indonesia is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the US and China. This tension has created disunity within ASEAN on issues such as AUKUS and the South China Sea, threatening ASEAN’s credibility. Domestically, Indonesian policymakers are divided over China, particularly given the country’s reliance on Belt and Road funding. Analysts often reduce Indonesia’s foreign policy to great power politics, interpreting its engagement with China as evidence of alignment. But this overlooks Indonesia’s long‑standing principle of an ‘independent and active’ foreign policy and its commitment to multilateralism. Gurjit Singh of the Observer Research Foundation has argued that Indonesia’s foreign policy is not about choosing sides but about asserting autonomy and shaping the international order in ways that benefit middle powers.

Indonesia’s role as a middle power is often underestimated. Scholars dismiss the ability of Asian middle powers to influence global politics, yet Indonesia’s presidency of the G20 in 2022 demonstrated otherwise. Ujang Komarudin and Syafiuddin Fadlillah highlighted how Indonesia used the summit to mediate between great powers amid divisions over the war in Ukraine. The Bali summit produced a joint declaration condemning Russia’s invasion, despite deep rifts, showing Indonesia’s ability to use institutions to bridge divides. As Temjenmeren Ao of the Indian Council of World Affairs observed, Indonesia’s stewardship of the G20 was marked by efforts to keep global cooperation alive despite geopolitical tensions.

Looking ahead, Indonesia could play a greater global role, but this depends on how future leaders shape foreign policy. Widodo will step down in 2024, and the new president will inherit a complex landscape. Rising tensions in the Indo‑Pacific, climate change, energy security, and global health issues all demand creative strategies. Indonesia’s success in achieving greater representation for non‑Western middle powers will depend on the issues it raises and how it engages internationally.

To maintain ASEAN unity amid US‑China rivalry, Indonesia must assert stronger leadership within the bloc. Restoring democracy in Myanmar is a key test. Indonesia could leverage its credibility to persuade opposing forces, including the junta, to hold peace talks. The ASEAN Regional Forum could serve as a venue for dialogue among ASEAN’s partners, including the US and China, to ease tensions. Beyond Southeast Asia, Indonesia should deepen engagement with other small and middle powers by building common ground in institutions such as the UN. Such initiatives could help ease great power tensions and address security challenges faced by smaller states.

Indonesia’s foreign policy has evolved from Yudhoyono’s democracy‑driven agenda to Widodo’s development‑focused pragmatism. It has shifted from close alignment with the US to a more balanced approach that embraces China’s economic opportunities while maintaining autonomy. Its democratic vision has shaped ASEAN institutions, even as sovereignty concerns limit its reach. And its role as a middle power has been demonstrated through the G20. The future of Indonesia’s global influence will depend on how its leaders navigate great power rivalry, regional disunity, and non‑traditional security challenges. If Indonesia can continue to balance pragmatism with principle, it may well secure a greater role for middle powers in shaping the international order.