Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Widodo

 

Photo source: The New York Times

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

Indonesia’s foreign policy has changed significantly over the past two decades. The first shift lies in its priorities. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the country focused on strengthening democracy and rebuilding its global standing after a troubled period marked by human rights abuses, corruption and widespread public protests. In the aftermath of Suharto’s fall, demands for reform had exposed deep dissatisfaction with the state. Yudhoyono sought to move beyond this legacy, presenting Indonesia as ‘a model for Muslim democracy’ and launching the Bali Democracy Forum. Scholars such as Lina Alexandra and Tobias Basuki note that this initiative helped project Indonesia’s soft power through democratic values while restoring credibility at home and abroad.

Under Joko Widodo, the emphasis has shifted towards economic priorities. His administration has aligned foreign policy with development goals, including infrastructure expansion, regional connectivity and the construction of the new capital, Nusantara. As Mohamad Rosyidin observes, democracy is no longer treated as an end in itself but as a means to support growth. Widodo has consistently framed diplomacy as a tool to deliver tangible benefits for citizens.

A second shift is visible in Indonesia’s engagement with major powers. While Yudhoyono maintained closer ties with the United States and the liberal international order, Widodo has adopted a more balanced approach. Melinda Martinus of the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute notes that Jakarta has deliberately broadened its partnerships, particularly with China, to secure economic opportunities while avoiding overdependence on any single power.

This approach is evident in Indonesia’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. As reported by The Conversation and CDR News, Indonesia has become a major recipient of Chinese investment in Southeast Asia. Key projects include the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed railway and funding linked to Nusantara, reflecting a pragmatic strategy that combines cooperation with caution.

Indonesia has also continued to play an active role within ASEAN. It contributed to shaping the ASEAN Charter and supported the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. More recently, Widodo has urged ASEAN to act on its five-point consensus on Myanmar, calling for an end to violence and a return to dialogue.

At the same time, Indonesia has remained mindful of ASEAN’s principle of non-interference. Rather than pressing for internal reforms in member states, it has focused on maintaining regional stability—an approach that differs from Western methods of promoting democracy through pressure or conditionality.

The most pressing challenge for Jakarta is the growing rivalry between the United States and China. This competition has exposed divisions within ASEAN on issues such as AUKUS and the South China Sea. While some observers interpret Indonesia’s engagement with China as alignment, this overlooks its long-standing ‘independent and active’ doctrine. As Gurjit Singh of the Observer Research Foundation argues, Indonesia seeks to preserve autonomy while shaping outcomes in a changing global order.

Indonesia’s ability to act as a middle power has become more visible in recent years. Its leadership during the G20 Bali Summit 2022 demonstrated its diplomatic capacity. Scholars Ujang Komarudin and Syafiuddin Fadlillah highlight how Jakarta worked to bridge divisions among major powers during the Russia-Ukraine War. Despite tensions, the summit produced a joint declaration, showing Indonesia’s ability to keep dialogue open. Temjenmeren Ao of the Indian Council of World Affairs noted that Indonesia played a stabilising role during a period of global strain.

Looking ahead, Indonesia’s international role is likely to expand, though it faces a complex set of challenges. The transition after Widodo’s presidency will be crucial, as the next leader navigates rising Indo-Pacific tensions, climate concerns, energy demands and public health risks.

Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s leadership will be tested by the need to maintain ASEAN unity. The crisis in Myanmar remains a key issue, where Jakarta could use its diplomatic standing to encourage dialogue. Platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum may also help facilitate engagement between major powers, including the United States and China. Beyond the region, stronger cooperation with other middle powers through institutions like the United Nations could enhance Indonesia’s influence.

Overall, Indonesia’s foreign policy has evolved from a democracy-focused approach to one centred on development and strategic balance. It now reflects a careful effort to combine economic priorities with diplomatic independence. Its growing role as a middle power is evident, but its future influence will depend on how effectively it manages external rivalries and internal transitions in an increasingly uncertain global environment.