India's Political Inroads in Middle East

 

Photo source: The New Arab

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

China’s growing diplomatic activism in the Middle East—most notably its role in facilitating the 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia—has underscored a broader shift: the region is no longer shaped solely by the United States and Russia. In this evolving landscape, India has begun to assert itself more quietly, positioning as a pragmatic middle power seeking influence through economic and strategic engagement.

A glimpse of this ambition emerged in May 2023, when Jake Sullivan met counterparts from India and the United Arab Emirates, alongside Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. As reported by outlets such as Reuters and The New York Times, discussions centred on an ambitious connectivity initiative linking India with the Middle East through ports, railways and road networks—an effort aimed at deepening trade and economic integration.

This proposal builds on the work of the I2U2 Group, established in 2022 and comprising India, Israel, the UAE and the United States. Unlike traditional security alliances, the grouping focuses on economic cooperation, infrastructure and technology. Its design reflects a broader shift in regional diplomacy, where development and connectivity increasingly shape geopolitical alignments.

For Washington, such initiatives serve a wider strategic purpose. Despite frequent claims of declining American influence, the United States is actively linking its Middle East engagement with its Indo-Pacific strategy. By strengthening partnerships with India, it aims to counterbalance China’s expanding footprint while reinforcing connections between the two regions.

The idea of closer ties between India, Israel and the Gulf predates these developments. In 2021, analyst Mohammed Soliman described this emerging alignment as an ‘Indo-Abrahamic alliance’, capturing the convergence of economic interests and political cooperation among these actors.

Historical context helps explain this trajectory. Links between the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent date back to the colonial era, when trade and strategic ties deepened under British rule. After independence, India largely maintained distance from the region’s power politics, adhering to its non-aligned stance during the Cold War while supporting the Palestinian cause. Since 2014, however, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pursued a more proactive approach, expanding both economic and strategic engagement across the Middle East.

From the American perspective, these developments complement earlier initiatives such as the Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the UAE. As analysts writing in Foreign Policy have noted, Washington increasingly views such frameworks as a way ‘to do more with less’—leveraging regional partnerships rather than direct intervention.

India’s own ties with Israel have deepened significantly in recent decades. Since establishing full diplomatic relations in 1992, cooperation has expanded across defence, technology and intelligence. Under Benjamin Netanyahu and Modi, relations have grown particularly close, with India emerging as one of the largest importers of Israeli defence equipment. This partnership extends to sensitive geographical areas, including surveillance and security technologies.

Israel’s participation in I2U2 further strengthens its role in emerging regional frameworks. Although formal diplomatic ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia remain absent, the United States has continued to encourage normalisation between the two. As Soliman observed, ‘Riyadh has nurtured good relations with Israel and India and may look to this grouping as a strategic opportunity in the long run.’

Economic interests underpin much of this alignment. The Gulf Cooperation Council remains a vital partner for India, supplying energy resources and hosting a large Indian diaspora that contributes significant remittances. More recently, ties with the UAE have expanded into new areas, including space cooperation and large-scale investments across infrastructure, manufacturing and renewable energy sectors.

These relationships have also carried political implications. Gulf states have, at times, taken a more accommodating stance towards India on sensitive issues such as Kashmir, while economic engagement—including Emirati investment—has reinforced Delhi’s position in the region, even as it complicates relations with Pakistan.

India’s outreach has extended to Egypt as well. Growing cooperation reflects Cairo’s renewed strategic importance in the Mediterranean and its economic needs. During his visit to Delhi in January 2023, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi emphasised the value of closer economic ties, a position widely reported in regional media. Such engagement could, over time, open the door to Egypt’s deeper involvement in groupings like I2U2.

Despite these advances, India has approached China’s regional role with caution. While it has welcomed routine diplomatic developments—such as ambassadorial exchanges between Gulf states and Iran—it has remained notably reserved on Beijing’s mediation efforts. This restraint reflects unease about China’s expanding influence, even as India continues to engage with it economically.

At the same time, India has not simply aligned itself with Washington. Its foreign policy retains a strong element of autonomy. For instance, discussions with the UAE on settling non-oil trade in Indian rupees—rather than US dollars—illustrate Delhi’s willingness to explore alternatives within the global financial system.

As Jonathan Fenton-Harvey argued in The New Arab, ‘Given the nuances of India’s foreign policy… US officials may be wrong to solely see Delhi as a bulwark against Beijing.’ India’s growing role in the Middle East, therefore, is less about alignment and more about adaptation—an effort to navigate an increasingly multipolar region where influence is diffuse and opportunities are shared.

What is emerging is a more layered geopolitical order. India is neither replacing traditional powers nor directly competing with them; instead, it is carving out space through connectivity, trade and selective partnerships. In doing so, it reflects a broader transformation in Middle Eastern politics—one in which middle powers are no longer peripheral, but increasingly central to shaping outcomes.