Thailand's Myanmar Plan

 

Photo source: CNN

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

Myanmar’s crisis has dragged on into a protracted and embittered conflict between the junta government, run by the Tatmadaw, and a disparate range of opposing forces with competing agendas – from pro‑democracy dissidents to ethnic armed organisations in states such as Kachin and Shan. Since the military coup in 2021, estimates suggest that more than 50,000 people have died, including thousands of civilians. The Tatmadaw tentatively maintains its grip on power in core territories such as Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw, but its influence in peripheral regions, especially in the north, is increasingly tenuous. Popular disillusionment and internal splintering within the military have contributed to inefficiencies and the effective failure to maintain control across roughly half of the country’s territory.

Against this backdrop, Myanmar’s neighbours, particularly Thailand, face mounting pressure to assume a more robust role in brokering peace. The Myanmar–Thailand border stretches over 2,400 kilometers, and the influx of refugees into Thailand, alongside disruptions to regional infrastructure projects, has raised the salience of the Myanmar issue among Thai technocrats and bureaucrats. Premesha Saha, writing for the Observer Research Foundation, has pointed out that ASEAN’s ‘Five‑Point Consensus’ has achieved little since 2021, leaving individual states like Thailand to shoulder more responsibility in stabilising the crisis.

Thailand’s role has evolved in three observable dimensions. First, leadership decisions and statements have shifted tone. In December 2023, Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, a business tycoon turned politician, emphasised his determination to engage directly with the Tatmadaw to tackle the escalating conflict. He appointed General Songwit to lead the armed forces, a commander regarded as more independent and pragmatic than many of his predecessors, with a reputation for focusing on outcomes rather than political loyalties. This appointment signalled a departure from the previous military‑led government of Prayut Chan‑o‑cha, which had often been criticised for tacitly accommodating Myanmar’s junta.

Second, Thailand’s bureaucracy has stepped up international and multilateral efforts. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2024, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha‑Nukara stated that Thailand would work with ASEAN and external partners to advance regional peace. He later visited Mae Sot and promised to initiate a humanitarian corridor to deliver aid to civilians in Myanmar, a pledge fulfilled in March 2024 when trucks carrying food and medical supplies crossed into Myawaddy.

Thai journalists covering the event noted that the corridor was endorsed by ASEAN but limited in scale, reaching only a fraction of Myanmar’s 2.6 million displaced persons.

Third, Thailand has shifted toward spearheading humanitarian engagement. Vice Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow announced plans to establish a ‘humanitarian safe zone’ near the Mae Sot–Myawaddy crossing, designed to provide food and medical assistance to displaced persons. Reports highlighted that the initiative aimed to serve around 20,000 people in three towns, with hopes that it might pave the way for dialogue between the junta, ethnic armed groups, and the National Unity Government. The Thai Red Cross and Myanmar Red Cross were enlisted to collaborate, with ASEAN foreign ministers offering endorsement.

These policy announcements reflect a fundamental acknowledgement among Thailand’s political elite that more must be done. Yet two critical concerns remain. First, the scalability of humanitarian efforts is questionable. Displaced persons in Rakhine, Chin, and western Shan are far removed from the Thai border, and the Mae Sot–Myawaddy safe zone, while symbolic, cannot suffice as a comprehensive solution. Second, the Tatmadaw’s willingness to negotiate in good faith is uncertain. Without concrete incentives, coordination with China, and a roadmap for reconciliation, the junta has little reason to relinquish its assertion of sovereignty over economically vital regions.

Some argue that talk of a pivot in Thailand’s Myanmar policy is premature, given the enduring ties between the Thai and Myanmar militaries. Yet this critique is reductionist. It assumes that regime change is a viable solution, ignoring intermediate options that may or may not be more realistic given Myanmar’s political realities. Bangkok’s recent pivots away from an implicitly pro‑Tatmadaw stance are motivated by several factors. One is concern over the junta’s inability to rein in migrant and drug trafficking across the porous border. Another is the Kokang debacle in northern Shan State, where resistance groups, with Chinese support, seized control of dozens of towns and border crossings. Analysts noted that Beijing is increasingly sceptical of the junta’s competence, given the importance of stability in Shan State for the Belt and Road Initiative.

Political considerations also play a role. Hedging between the junta and rebels is strategic, given widespread animosity toward the former among Myanmar’s population. The junta’s enactment of compulsory military service has accelerated the exodus of young people, with long queues forming at the Thai embassy in Yangon. Even within pro‑military circles, discontent is evident, as seen in public criticisms of junta chief Min Aung Hlaing by influential monk Pauk Kotaw.

Most fundamentally, Thailand’s diplomatic leadership is keen to signal a break with the previous administration. Having launched its bid for candidature in the United Nations Human Rights Council, Bangkok is determined to demonstrate its commitment to humanitarian norms and multilateralism. In March 2024, Vice Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow stressed at the Human Rights Council in Geneva that Thailand was deeply concerned about the worsening crisis and the need to upscale humanitarian assistance along the border. This reflects a conscious effort to project influence in a benign manner and to distance Thailand’s foreign policy from its military‑driven past.

The Myanmar crisis remains deeply complex, with the Tatmadaw weakened but entrenched, the opposition fragmented, and regional powers like China playing decisive roles. Thailand’s recent initiatives – humanitarian corridors, safe zones, and diplomatic signalling – are important steps, but they are limited in scope and fraught with challenges. Whether Bangkok can transform these gestures into meaningful progress depends on its ability to balance domestic political considerations, regional diplomacy, and the hard realities of Myanmar’s fractured landscape. For now, Thailand’s pivot is more symbolic than transformative, but it signals that the winds of change are blowing in Southeast Asia’s approach to Myanmar.