India's Foreign Policy in South China Sea

 

Photo source: DD News

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s five‑day tour of Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia in March 2024 was part of India’s broader effort to deepen engagement with ASEAN. His visit came at a time when India’s relations with Southeast Asia have grown more slowly than with partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Yet the trip underscored India’s recognition that ASEAN remains central to its ‘Act East’ policy and Indo‑Pacific strategy.

In Singapore, Jaishankar met Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, with discussions focusing on digital cooperation, fintech, food security and skills development. Singapore has long been India’s strongest economic partner in ASEAN, and the visit reinforced the importance of building on this foundation.

In Manila, Jaishankar’s remarks were more strategic. He called for ‘staunch adherence to a rules‑based order’ and reaffirmed ‘India’s support to the Philippines for upholding its national sovereignty’. These words were widely interpreted as a signal to Beijing, given the Philippines’ disputes with China in the South China Sea. India’s support was not merely rhetorical: New Delhi has already supplied BrahMos missiles to the Philippines, marking one of its most significant defence exports. Analysts noted that India sees the Philippines as a partner in balancing China’s assertiveness in maritime Asia.

Critics argue that India’s invocation of the rules‑based order is selective, since it resists external mediation in its own border disputes. Yet India’s position on the South China Sea is consistent with its long‑standing emphasis on freedom of navigation and respect for international law under UNCLOS. The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling invalidated China’s expansive nine‑dash line claims, affirming the Philippines’ rights. India’s support therefore aligns with international legal precedent rather than simply provoking China.

China has accused the Philippines of encroaching on its sovereignty, but this claim is contested. Many ASEAN states prefer a cautious approach, avoiding direct confrontation with Beijing. Malaysia, for example, asserts its maritime claims but emphasises dialogue and cooperation. This diversity of approaches complicates ASEAN consensus, yet Singapore and others have encouraged India to play a larger role in regional affairs.

Commentators in Chinese media suggested that India risks appearing subservient to US strategy. However, independent analysts highlight that India’s Indo‑Pacific policy is driven by its own interests: balancing China, securing sea lanes, and diversifying partnerships. Unlike Japan, India is not a treaty ally of the US, and its cooperation with ASEAN is framed as part of its own ‘Act East’ policy.

Malaysia’s cautious diplomacy provides a contrast. While it is a direct party to the South China Sea disputes, it continues to emphasise peaceful negotiations and friendly cooperation. This approach illustrates that regional stability depends on dialogue as much as deterrence. For India, the lesson is clear: closer economic and trade relations with ASEAN, alongside political trust, are essential to building durable partnerships.

Jaishankar’s tour was therefore not about stirring trouble but about consolidating India’s role in Southeast Asia. His support for the Philippines may irritate Beijing, but it reflects India’s broader Indo‑Pacific vision. The challenge lies in ASEAN’s internal divisions and the need for India to build trust through trade and diplomacy as well as security cooperation.

In conclusion, India’s March 2024 outreach to ASEAN was a strategic move to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia. While its support for the Philippines highlights security concerns, the long‑term success of India’s policy will depend on balancing strategic competition with economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement.