Political Realities of Taiwan

 

Photo source: East Asia Forum

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

The CIA has suggested that President Xi Jinping has instructed China’s military to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan. Former CIA Director William Burns made this point in 2023, and analysts such as Edan Morag at the Institute for National Security Studies have further reiterated that 2027 is seen as the year China could have the capability to forcibly unify Taiwan.

Taiwanese defence experts, reported by Fang Wei‑li and Jonathan Chin in the Taipei Times, clarified that Beijing’s goal is to prepare for military unification by 2027, not to set a fixed date for war.

This threat loomed large over Taiwan’s January 2024 elections. Lai Ching‑te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency with around 40 per cent of the vote, defeating Hou Yu‑ih of the Kuomintang (KMT). As Brian Hart and Jude Blanchette noted in their analysis for CSIS, the election drew global attention because of rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The DPP has long emphasised Taiwan’s separate identity from China, while the KMT has historically sought accommodation with Beijing. The foreign policy community in Washington clearly tilts toward the DPP, which resonates with American emphasis on democracy and freedom.

Yet some analysts argue that a KMT victory might have temporarily reduced cross‑strait tensions, giving Washington breathing space to strengthen its military deterrent. With wars in Europe and the Middle East stretching US power, the question of whether a DPP win is strategically advantageous remains contested. Maintaining Taiwan’s sovereignty is one of Washington’s fixed priorities. As the Pentagon has repeatedly stated, China is the United States’ most formidable rival, and Taiwan, just 100 miles from China’s coast, is the ally most consistently threatened.

Admiral John Aquilino, head of US Indo‑Pacific Command, warned in 2022 that China is conducting ‘the largest military buildup in history since World War II’. Australian and British officials have echoed this concern. Meanwhile, the US defence budget has remained roughly flat as a share of GDP, far below Cold War levels, even as the military‑industrial base is strained by supplying Ukraine and Israel. The Wall Street Journal reported that simulations found America would run out of long‑range anti‑ship missiles within the first week of a war over Taiwan, underscoring the dire shortage of munitions.

China’s Communist Party will never recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state. The most effective way to prevent outright conflict is to keep postponing it, ideally without end, by relying on carefully maintained ambiguities such as the ‘one China’ policy. 

The KMT, chastened by Xi’s crackdown in Hong Kong in 2020, has been forced to take the China threat more seriously and would not be in a position to give away Taiwan even if it wanted to. But with the DPP securing a third consecutive term, hawks in Beijing may argue that Taiwanese nationalists are firmly in control and that force is the only realistic resolution.

This comes at a time when US deterrent power is more decayed than it has been in decades. Michael J. Lostumbo has observed that much of Taiwan’s defence budget is locked into capabilities that are neither survivable nor potent, leaving Taipei reliant on the US Air Force and Navy to ride to the rescue. Despite reforms, the DPP has not fundamentally altered Taiwan’s severe defence deficiencies during its eight years in power.

Even after the election, avoiding Taiwan’s absorption by China remains a top US foreign policy priority. The convergence between Washington and Taipei will continue, and that alignment can help ward off a Chinese attack if Taiwan and the United States diligently build up their defences in the coming years.

Following Taiwan’s general elections in January 2024, several South Asian countries released statements supporting China’s claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory and reaffirming the ‘One China’ principle. Shantanu Roy‑Chaudhury, writing for East Asia Forum, noted that this outpouring of support showcased Beijing’s ability to use economic and political influence in South Asia to control the discourse over Taiwan. India refrained from a formal statement, but other governments in the region aligned themselves with Beijing’s position.

With the Indian Ocean becoming a centre of geopolitical competition, Beijing’s influence and presence will only increase. These statements of support are part of China’s toolkit for cementing its claims over Taiwan. They underscore how economic power can be leveraged for political and diplomatic ends, and how Beijing has succeeded in shaping the narrative in South Asia.

Taken together, the CIA’s warnings about 2027, the DPP’s electoral victory, Washington’s stretched military resources, and Beijing’s growing influence in South Asia all point to a precarious future. Taiwan remains at the heart of US strategy in Asia, but the island’s defence deficiencies and America’s overstretched commitments leave deterrence fragile. The challenge for Washington and Taipei is to strengthen their position quickly enough to prevent Beijing from concluding that force is the only option.