Kuwait’s Old Guard Mediation

 Photo source: Washington Institute

 By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

 Sheikh Sabah al‑Ahmad al‑Sabah’s death in September 2020 closed a chapter in Gulf diplomacy that had been defined by moderation and mediation. As foreign minister for four decades and emir from 2006, he cultivated Kuwait’s reputation as a neutral actor in the Middle East. The Financial Times described him as one of the last elder statesmen of the Gulf, a leader who preferred shuttle diplomacy to confrontation, while Al Jazeera emphasised his role in shaping Kuwait’s image as a bridge‑builder. His family has ruled Kuwait for nearly two and a half centuries, but it was Sabah’s personal style that gave the country influence beyond its size.

He was instrumental in the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981, and his warnings about the dangers of unchecked rivalries were prescient. In his final speech to the national assembly in 2017, after visiting Saudi Arabia, he cautioned that the collapse of the ‘Gulf house’ would damage the region, a warning reported by Reuters. This led to a Kuwaiti mediation effort that allowed the 38th Gulf Summit to be held in Kuwait in December 2017, though the summit was shortened to one day because Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sent only low‑level representatives, as noted by BBC News.

The reactions to his death were striking. Condolences came not only from allies such as the United States but also from rivals including Iran and Israel. The New York Times observed that few Arab leaders received such broad respect, highlighting his ability to maintain dialogue across divides. Sabah had maintained close relations with Washington, supporting US efforts against ISIS despite rising anti‑Western sentiment in the region, as reported by The Washington Post.

He was often described as the ‘king of cooperation’. He improved relations with Iraq after the First Gulf War, stressing reconciliation and securing Kuwait’s decision to adjourn Iraqi reparations payments in 2014, according to The Guardian. He also helped reintegrate Qatar into the GCC in 2014. Yet when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE boycotted Qatar in 2014 and again in 2017, his mediation could not end the stalemate. Despite meeting crown princes in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, he was unable to convince them to compromise. Analysts writing in the Washington Institute argued that his successor would inherit these unresolved disputes, raising doubts about whether Kuwait’s reputation for mediation was tied to the state itself or to Sabah personally.

Elana Delozier of the Washington Institute observed that Kuwait’s future as a mediator under new leadership was uncertain, because Sabah and Oman’s Sultan Qaboos represented an older generation of Gulf leaders who managed foreign policy differently. She noted that the public nature of the rift, underscored by citizens being tacitly allowed to criticise regional states and leaders on social media, prevented any of the parties from saving face without the other side capitulating.

Sheikh Nawaf al‑Ahmad al‑Sabah, who succeeded Sabah in 2020, has sparked concerns about Kuwait’s ability to sustain its mediating role. Nawaf is seen as lacking the diplomatic experience and aura of neutrality that defined his predecessor. To gain leverage, he must first address Kuwait’s longstanding tensions with Iraq and manage its proximity to Iran. Analysts in Gulf International Forum believe that Kuwait’s mediation has historically produced two outcomes: proximity to the United States and domestic stability.

The United States has relied on Kuwait’s neutrality in GCC disputes, and Sabah’s skill was central to this. Despite Kuwait’s endorsement of Palestinian rights, Washington considered it a key partner. Yet as commentators in The Washington Post noted, the US may re‑evaluate its policy if Kuwait’s neutrality falters. Proximity between Kuwait and the US is expected to persist, but Nawaf may not wield the same influence. In the longer term, Kuwait could be forced to take sides on contentious issues such as Iraq.

Some analysts believe Oman might fill Kuwait’s shoes as a mediator. However, Oman’s neutrality on issues such as the Qatar rift, the Yemen war and Iran has irritated Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, according to reporting in The Guardian. Gulf International Forum pointed out that younger, assertive leadership in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar may seek to meddle in Kuwaiti politics directly, even through its national assembly, setting a dangerous precedent.

The broader question is whether Kuwait’s reputation for mediation was a product of Sheikh Sabah’s personal diplomacy or a structural feature of Kuwaiti foreign policy. Scholars such as Courtney Freer at Qatar University have argued that Sabah’s death raised concerns that Kuwait’s foreign policy could diverge from the neutral role he carved out. His ability to balance ties with the US, maintain dialogue with Iran, and reconcile with Iraq was unique. Without him, Kuwait risks being drawn into the polarisation that defines today’s Gulf politics.

Sabah’s legacy illustrates the paradox of small states in the Gulf. Kuwait, despite its size, wielded outsized influence through diplomacy rather than military power. His shuttle diplomacy allowed Kuwait to survive regional storms, from the Iraqi invasion in 1990 to the Qatar crisis decades later. Yet the rise of younger Gulf leaders, more assertive and less inclined to compromise, has undercut the space for such mediation.

The future of Kuwait’s role in the Middle East will depend on whether Sheikh Nawaf can adapt to this new environment. He must balance Kuwait’s ties with Washington, manage relations with Iraq and Iran, and resist external pressures from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Analysts warn that if Kuwait loses its neutrality, it risks domestic instability and diminished international relevance. The Gulf has lost one of its greatest mediators, and whether Kuwait can sustain that legacy remains uncertain.