Idlib has been a Test for Erdogan-Putin Relationship

 

Photo source: Moscow Times

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

Diplomatic relations between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan reached a breaking point in late February 2020, when thirty‑three Turkish soldiers were killed in a single airstrike in Idlib. According to CNN reporters Gul Tuysuz and Isil Sariyuce, the attack was the deadliest day for Turkey’s forces since their involvement in Syria began. Al Jazeera also confirmed the scale of the losses, noting that Turkey vowed to retaliate against ‘all’ Syrian positions. The UN estimated that nearly 700,000 civilians had been displaced between December 2019 and February 2020 as fighting escalated, underscoring the humanitarian toll.

Turkey’s defence minister Hulusi Akar charged that the attack had occurred despite coordination with Russian officials. His communications director, Fahrettin Altun, argued that Moscow bore responsibility under the Astana and Sochi accords. Yet the Russian Defence Ministry rejected Akar’s claim. Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, insisted that ‘Russia cannot prohibit the Syrian army from executing the demands written in United Nations resolutions, which call for an uncompromising fight against terrorism in all its forms.’ This statement reflected Moscow’s consistent position: that Idlib was a haven for extremist groups and that Damascus had the right to reclaim it.

Erdogan’s response revealed contradictions. He telephoned Putin in an effort to resolve the crisis diplomatically, but simultaneously declared that all Syrian positions were legitimate targets. Turkey’s military claimed to have killed over 200 Syrian troops in retaliation. As Bulent Aliraza wrote in an op‑ed for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Erdoğan’s military moves reflected his ‘forward defence strategy’ — a doctrine aimed at confronting external enemies before they could threaten Turkey directly.

The humanitarian dimension was equally pressing. Hosting nearly four million Syrian refugees since 2011 has imposed a financial burden of more than $40 billion, by Erdogan’s own estimates. The Balyun airstrikes reinforced his priority of preventing further refugee influxes. At the same time, the crisis allowed him to stir nationalist sentiment during economic difficulties. He declared that ‘every struggle we avoid today in Syria, Libya, the Mediterranean, and our region will return to us with a heavier toll tomorrow. That is why we characterise it as a new war of independence for our country and nation.’

Putin, meanwhile, emphasised his concern about extremist groups in Idlib. This stance was a bitter blow for Erdogan, who had interpreted the 2018 Sochi agreement as a binding Russian commitment to restrain Assad’s forces. Turkey believed the accord preserved the status quo in Idlib, supervised by Turkish observation posts. Moscow, however, saw it as obliging Ankara to curb ‘radicals’ such as Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham, which by early 2019 had gained the upper hand over more moderate groups allied to Turkey. For Russia, this justified deadly bombing runs against opposition targets.

Erdogan responded by supplying additional equipment to opposition groups and inserting thousands of Turkish soldiers into Idlib. He also sought to widen the diplomatic equation by involving German and French leaders, recognising their concern over refugees. Yet his appeals to NATO and the UN Security Council produced little tangible support. Then‑President Donald Trump assured him of backing, but it never materialised. The Biden administration has since prioritised a minimalist Syria policy focused on fighting the Islamic State, leaving Turkey without the international support it sought.

As Bulent Aliraza further noted, Erdogan may have to settle for an interim compromise with Putin. The most Moscow appeared willing to offer was a ‘safe zone’ in western Idlib near the Turkish border, where refugees had fled. Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Çavuşoglu confirmed in 2020 that such a proposal had been presented in Moscow, though Ankara rejected it.

The root causes of disagreement remain unresolved. Turkey interprets the Sochi deal as protection for opposition enclaves, while Russia views it as a mandate to combat terrorism. These opposing positions ensure that the conflict will continue. If Erdogan feels cornered, he may escalate from artillery and drone strikes to direct engagement by Turkish troops against Assad’s forces.

Putin’s balancing act persisted into September 2021, when the two leaders met in Sochi for three hours of talks. The meeting underscored their uneasy partnership: cooperation in some areas, but fundamental discord over Idlib. As ABC News reported, Russia‑backed Syrian forces were determined to retake Idlib, while Turkey insisted on protecting its allies there. The February 2020 airstrikes were a turning point, exposing the fragility of their relationship and the enduring volatility of Syria’s war.