Idlib has been a Test for Erdogan-Putin Relationship
Photo source: Moscow Times
By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront
The diplomatic
relations between Putin and Erdogan took an ugly turn in February 2020, when thirty-three
Turkish soldiers were killed in a single attack by the Syrian army. The total
losses for Turkey that month went over fifty. The fear of war had already
displaced around seven hundred thousand Syrian civilians between December 2019 to February 2020, until a new escalation began.
Erdogan’s defense minister,
Hulusi Akar charged that the attack had taken place despite the fact that “the
location of Turkish troops had been coordinated with Russian officials in the
field.” His communications director, Fahrettin Altun, believed Moscow had
the responsibility to prevent such assaults by the Assad regime in accordance
with the Astana and Sochi accords between the two countries. Akar’s claim,
surprisingly, was specifically rejected by the Russian defense ministry. The
Russian foreign minister Lavrov, in a response, ascertained that “Russia cannot
prohibit the Syrian army from executing the demands written in United Nations
resolutions, which call for an uncompromising fight against terrorism in all
its forms.”
As Erdogan had called Putin
in February 2018, it reflected that Erdogan wanted to solve everything
diplomatically, for the time being. It must have been one of his most difficult
conversations. Although, this move had been one of his contradictions, too, as
he had informed his Russian counterparts after the attack that all Syrian
positions were legitimate targets, thereby letting an escalation of a proxy
war, which was all in all unpredictable.
Akun, by claiming to have killed,
over two hundred Syrian troops, gave the observers a stark reminder that Turkey
was not interested in quitting the war in Idlib anytime sooner. ‘Erdogan’s
military moves are being made in accordance with what he has been
consistently characterising as his forward defense strategy against external
enemies unhappy with Turkey’s growing role in its region and beyond,’ wrote
Bulent Aliraza in an Oped for Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The war in Syria poses a
lingering, massive humanitarian threat to Turkey, as Syrian refugees keep on cumulating
at Turkish borders. It, at the same time, also helps Erdogan to stir nationalistic
sentiments during economic difficulties. He once said: ‘if we are unable
to protect our country’s rightful place in the changing regional power
dynamics, they will transform our life here into a prison. Every struggle we
avoid today in Syria, Libya, the Mediterranean, and our region will return to
us with a heavier toll tomorrow. That is why we characterize it as a new war of
independence for our country and nation.’
Having been obliged to host
close to four million Syrian refugees in Turkey, as a consequence of
the failure of the opposition campaign Erdogan backed against Assad, since 2011, it resulted
in a massive financial burden for him of over $40 billion according to his own
estimates. Erdogan’s main priority, since the 2020 Balyun airstrikes, has been
to prevent a further influx of refugees.
Putin, in retaliation, to Turkish
aggression had also issued a statement, where he was concerned about the extremist
groups operating on Syrian soil. This resounding stance of Putin, resulted as a
bitter blow for Erdogan.
Hence, his metamorphic hard line on Idlib should not have come as a surprise to Erdogan, as the two sides had disagreed from the beginning in their interpretations of the Sochi ceasefire agreement they had signed in September 2018.
Erdogan has
also been supplying additional military equipment to opposition groups and
encourages them to mount counterattacks parallel to inserting thousands of
Turkish soldiers into Idlib.
Ankara had also chosen to
interpret the Sochi document as a binding Russian commitment to prevent the
Assad regime from attacking its opponents in their last remaining military
fortifications in Syria. The agreement also intended to preserve the status quo
in Idlib, supervised by observation posts, which Turkey was allowed to
establish along the line separating the two sides. Moscow saw it as a
contractual Turkish obligation to help combat terrorism by curbing ‘radicals’
in Idlib.
The upper hand the extremist
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham had gained in Idlib at the beginning of 2019 against more
moderate elements allied to Turkey had given the Russians the ideal excuse to
continue to carry out deadly bombing runs against opposition targets. It is now
clear that Damascus was focused in 2019 largely on consolidating its control in
other areas it had gradually seized from the opposition, which was eventually pushing
surviving fighters and civilians into Idlib. Putin was content, at that time,
to look beyond his differences there with Erdogan, and to focus on cooperation
in other areas.
Erdogan’s desire to broaden
the diplomatic equation by bringing the German and French leaders into the
Idlib conversation also testifies to his desire to gain additional leverage in
his trial of strength with Putin. His recognition of the importance of their
concern over refugees has been confirmed by his decisions.
When it comes to United States, then President Trump had assured him support, but he never got it, deepening his ever more pessimisms. The Biden administration, while supposedly still reviewing Syria policy, prioritises a minimalist approach focused on fighting the Islamic State and humanitarian assistance.
The emergency consultations on Idlib at NATO and the UN Security Council have also failed to produce the kind of international support Erdogan would have liked. It seems likely that on Idlib Erdogan will have to settle for an interim compromise with Putin. The most the Russians may be prepared to offer Turkey at this stage is a ‘safe zone’ in the western part of Idlib close to the Turkish border, where the refugees have fled. This was apparently suggested in a map that was given to the visiting Turkish delegation in Moscow, which Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu confirmed in 2020, which Turkey had not accepted.
The root causes of their
disagreement stem from their opposing positions relating to the Syrian civil
war that remain unresolved, and will undoubtedly provide reasons for continuation
of the conflict.
If Erdogan loses his nerve, he
might even seek to recover lost credibility by escalating from artillery
support and drone strikes to direct major engagement by Turkish troops with
Assad’s forces anytime. To counter this, Putin’s balancing act
continued in September 2021, when two political heavyweights, met in person
again in Sochi, Russia, where they talked for atleast three hours.
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