A Joint Patrol Mission Inside Syria

 

Photo source: Daily Sabah

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

In January 2022, the Russian Defence Ministry announced that its air force had begun joint patrols with Syrian military pilots along Syria’s borders. As reported by Al Arabiya News, the patrols involved fighter jets, fighter‑bombers and airborne early warning aircraft, flying routes from the Golan Heights through southern Syria and then along the Euphrates River up to the north. Moscow presented these patrols as demonstrations of solidarity with the Assad regime and as measures to help Damascus pre‑emptively counter threats. They also served Russia’s longer‑term goal of assisting Assad in regaining control over territory still held by opposition groups.

Adam Lammon, writing for the Centre for the National Interest, argued that the patrols were designed to enhance the Syrian military’s independent capabilities, asserting sovereignty while reducing Russia’s operational burden. Paul Iddon in Forbes offered a more nuanced interpretation, suggesting that Russia may have timed the patrols to coincide with a break in winter weather, anticipating that Israel could exploit such conditions to launch strikes in Syria. He added that the patrols along the Golan Heights were likely intended as a warning to Israel, following its December 2021 airstrikes on Latakia port, which had already irritated Moscow.

Israel’s air campaign against Iran‑linked targets in Syria has been ongoing for nearly a decade. As Reuters reported, Israel has repeatedly struck Hezbollah positions and Iranian militias, including several attacks on Latakia in 2013, 2014 and 2018, the latter sparking heightened tensions with Russia due to its military presence in the area. These joint patrols, therefore, were interpreted in Tel Aviv as alarming developments. Israeli military officers reportedly engaged Damascus in talks to defuse tensions, but the underlying reality remained: Israel was determined to prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria, while Russia sought to balance its ties with both Assad and Israel.

The political backdrop was equally fraught. In October 2021, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett declared that Israel would retain the Golan Heights, captured in 1967, regardless of international opinion. As The Guardian noted, Bennett pledged to double the Israeli population in the Golan, equalling the Druze Arab community, and later emphasised to Vladimir Putin that relations between Israel and Russia were vital, citing the million Russian speakers in Israel. Putin congratulated Bennett on his premiership, underscoring the importance Moscow placed on maintaining dialogue with Tel Aviv. Since 2015, Israel and Russia had operated a de‑confliction mechanism to avoid clashes in Syria, though incidents still occurred.

Iran and Syria, however, have long complained that Moscow does not fully share their views. Russia only occasionally condemns Israeli strikes as destabilising, and often refrains from stronger action. Anton Mardasov wrote in Al‑Monitor that this ambivalence reflects Russia’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Israel and, by extension, the United States. Moscow recognises that maintaining cordial ties with Israel reduces the risk of escalation with Washington, even if it frustrates Assad and Tehran.

The issue of air defence systems illustrates this tension. Russia supplied Syria with S‑300 systems, but has been reluctant to allow their full operational use. Analysts noted that Moscow appears to retain control over these systems, preventing Damascus from firing them during Israeli raids. This reluctance suggests that Russia wants to avoid a direct clash between Israel and Syria, even as it stages joint patrols to project solidarity.

From Tehran’s perspective, the patrols are welcome. Iranian officials see them as reducing Damascus’s reliance on Iran, while still bolstering Assad’s position. Russia’s presence in Syria since 2015 has already turned the tide of the war in Assad’s favour, and Moscow continues to view its bases at Khmeimim and Tartus as strategic assets, projecting power into the Mediterranean and complicating NATO’s southern flank.

Yet Russia’s ambitions extend beyond Syria. Anton Mardasov in Al‑Monitor reported that in December 2021, Moscow moved more than twenty aircraft and helicopters from Khmeimim to airfields in Hasakah and Deir ez‑Zor, with A‑50 AWACS aircraft coordinating operations. This manoeuvre placed Russian forces closer to US positions, heightening tensions rather than easing them. Mardasov argued that Russia lacks the capacity to deploy thousands of troops quickly, given its modest fleet of transport aircraft and limited ocean‑going warships. Nevertheless, these moves were intended to demonstrate that Russia’s military grouping in Syria was more than symbolic: it was a platform for projecting influence into Venezuela, Africa and beyond.

Despite these efforts, foreign air forces continue to operate freely over Syrian skies. The United States, Turkey and Israel regularly conduct missions, often with precision strikes against Syrian aircraft. Decades of attrition have left Syria’s air force depleted, its planes visibly worn and vulnerable. The joint patrols were meant to showcase Syrian sovereignty, but in practice they underscored Damascus’s dependence on Moscow.

The logic of Russia’s joint patrols, therefore, is layered. On one level, they are about demonstrating solidarity with Assad and signalling deterrence to Israel. On another, they are about reducing Russia’s operational burden by training Syrian pilots and asserting Syrian sovereignty. At the same time, they are about balancing Moscow’s relations with Israel, Iran and the United States. As Paul Iddon in Forbes observed, the patrols were as much about political messaging as military utility. They conveyed Russia’s annoyance at Israeli strikes, reassured Assad of Moscow’s support, and reminded Washington of Russia’s enduring presence in Syria.

Yet the contradictions remain stark. Russia wants to appear as Assad’s protector, but it hesitates to confront Israel directly. It wants to reduce its burden in Syria, but it cannot fully trust Assad’s forces to operate independently. It wants to project power against NATO and the US, but its logistical limitations constrain its reach. And it wants to balance ties with Iran, but Tehran’s ground presence often undermines Moscow’s diplomatic manoeuvres.

Ultimately, the joint patrols of January 2022 were emblematic of Russia’s broader strategy in Syria: a careful balancing act between deterrence and restraint, projection and pragmatism. They were less about changing the military balance than about signalling Russia’s determination to remain a central player in Syria’s skies. For Assad, they offered reassurance; for Israel, they raised alarms; for Iran, they promised reduced reliance; and for Washington, they underscored the persistence of Russian influence.