Syria's Last War Zone

Photo source: Washington Post

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

In September 2018, Russia and Turkey reached what became known as the Sochi Agreement, a deal that temporarily prevented a full‑scale assault on Idlib province, home to nearly three million people. As Al Jazeera reported, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the creation of a demilitarised buffer zone, 15–20 kilometres deep, to be established by 15 October 2018, with rebel fighters expected to withdraw heavy weapons while Russian and Turkish patrols, supported by drones, would monitor the area. The Arab Center Washington DC, in analysis by Joe Macaron, stressed that the deal was always fragile, testing Russian–Turkish relations and hinging on the willingness of radical factions to comply. The Guardian’s Martin Chulov added that the agreement was seen by many Syrians as a temporary reprieve rather than a durable peace.

On the ground, the truce offered temporary relief. Farmers began buying seeds and fertilisers, trade resumed among local merchants, and some displaced families cautiously returned to southern Idlib. Parents sent children back to school, and warehouses storing chickpeas and figs sought to re‑establish contacts. Even potato chip factories and pistachio farms, which had suffered low yields during the war, looked to restart production. Yet beneath this fragile normality, the threat of renewed violence loomed. The New York Times reported that residents feared the buffer zone would collapse at any moment, given the presence of hardline factions unwilling to compromise.

Civilian suffering remained immense. UN reports confirmed that more than half of Idlib’s medical centres were out of service. Protests erupted against the Assad regime, with families holding placards and portraits of detainees demanding their release. Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, warned that further bloodshed could trigger mass displacement, adding to the 360,000 deaths already recorded in the Syrian conflict by its eighth year. BBC correspondents covering Idlib noted that hospitals were overwhelmed, with doctors forced to operate without anaesthetics and children dying from preventable diseases.

Turkey’s role was complex. It had supported factions such as the Free Syrian Army and Sham Legion, hoping to weaken Assad and secure influence along its southern border. Ankara deployed around 1,300 troops and established observation posts in Idlib. Yet Turkey also faced the risk of a refugee influx if fighting resumed. Russia and Iran, meanwhile, provided decisive military backing to Assad. Christoph Reuter in Spiegel Online observed that Assad’s battlefield successes since 2015 were not due to his depleted army but to Russian air power, tens of thousands of Hezbollah fighters, and militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan under Iranian command. Patrick Cockburn of The Independent similarly argued that Assad’s survival was largely the result of Moscow’s intervention and Tehran’s mobilisation of foreign fighters.

Extremist groups remained entrenched. Around 12,000 fighters from the former al‑Nusra Front, rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham, controlled large parts of Idlib. Comprised of Chechen, Tunisian, and German militants, they sought to impose an Islamic emirate, carrying out kidnappings and killings of businessmen and doctors. Analysts doubted such radicals would surrender heavy weapons, undermining the buffer zone’s viability. The Washington Post reported that HTS checkpoints continued to dominate trade routes, extorting merchants and undermining Turkish efforts to stabilise the province.

The United States, once committed to ousting Assad, had shifted focus to dismantling ISIS. With around 2,000 troops in eastern Syria working alongside Kurdish and Arab fighters under the Syrian Democratic Forces, Washington lacked the diplomatic capacity to shape a peaceful settlement. Christopher Bolan, writing for the US Army War College, warned that Assad might resort again to chemical weapons, potentially provoking a stronger response from America and its allies. The New York Times’ Anne Barnard noted that Washington’s Syria policy had narrowed to counterterrorism, leaving the diplomatic field largely to Moscow and Ankara.

Israel exploited the chaos to strike Iranian targets. Reuters reported that hundreds of airstrikes were launched against Syria to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel also backed counter‑insurgent forces in the Golan Heights to curb Iranian influence. Meanwhile, Russia controlled Syrian airspace, bombing Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta in support of Assad, as Al Jazeera documented. Haaretz journalists confirmed that Israeli strikes targeted weapons depots near Damascus and Homs, underscoring Tel Aviv’s determination to prevent Iranian entrenchment.

For civilians, the war’s brutality was relentless. In Idlib’s western city of Jisr al‑Shughur, where some of the earliest firefights of the conflict occurred, families sold homes and furniture to finance escape. Many fled with only what could fit on motorcycles or cars, as fighter jets roared overhead. The Guardian reported that families often travelled at night to avoid bombardment, carrying only bread and blankets, while children were traumatised by constant shelling.

The broader geopolitical picture was equally fraught. Iran, Russia, Turkey, Israel, and the United States were the main external actors. Washington demanded Iran’s withdrawal, while Moscow insisted on America’s departure from eastern Syria. Assad’s opposition was fragmented and ineffectual, leaving his regime dominant. Retaking Idlib remained central to Assad’s plan to reunify Syria, though he avoided direct confrontation with Kurdish areas protected by US forces. The Financial Times noted that Idlib had become the last major rebel stronghold, symbolising both the resilience of opposition forces and the determination of Assad to reclaim all territory.

The Sochi Agreement thus represented a temporary pause rather than a resolution. Al Jazeera noted that Erdogan hailed the deal as bringing hope to the region, but its implementation was fraught with irregularities. Hardcore militants refused to disarm, and clashes continued sporadically. For Russia, the agreement showcased its diplomatic leverage, while for Turkey it was a means to avoid a refugee crisis. Yet for civilians, it was a fragile reprieve amid years of devastation. The Guardian’s Kareem Shaheen observed that the deal was more about managing tensions between Moscow and Ankara than protecting civilians.

In narrative terms, Idlib symbolises the contradictions of Syria’s war. It is a fertile region with warehouses of chickpeas and fig harvests, yet also a battleground where international powers test their influence. It is a place where children return briefly to school, only to face renewed bombardment. It is a province where protests for detainees’ freedom echo alongside the entrenched presence of jihadist factions. Journalists from The Independent described Idlib as a microcosm of Syria’s tragedy, where daily life and destruction coexist uneasily.

Ultimately, the Sochi Agreement delayed but did not resolve the conflict. Assad’s regime, backed by Russia and Iran, remained determined to retake Idlib. Turkey sought to protect its border and influence events, while the United States focused narrowly on ISIS. As Christoph Reuter concluded in Spiegel Online, Assad’s victories were not his own but the product of foreign intervention. The fate of Idlib, and of Syria more broadly, continues to depend less on local actors than on the calculations of external powers.