Iraqis Back To Ballot Boxes

Photo Source: Kurdistan 24


By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Up Front

The May 12, 2018 parliamentary election in Iraq was described by Western media as a ‘landmark victory of democracy’ after years of instability and sectarian violence. It was the first national vote since the defeat of the Islamic State in Mosul in 2017, and the government sealed airports and land borders during polling for security reasons, according to Associated Press and Reuters. The election was contested across Iraq’s fragmented political landscape, with Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish blocs vying for influence.

The Sunni vote, traditionally concentrated among parties such as The Arab Project, Mutahidoon (United Project) and the Wataniya alliance, had diminished compared to earlier elections. Analysts noted that Sunni parties no longer commanded the numbers they once did, reflecting demographic shifts and political disillusionment, as Al Jazeera and Middle East Eye reported. Meanwhile, the Nasr alliance led by Haidar al‑Abadi, who had overseen the campaign against Islamic State, sought to retain power. Hadi al‑Amiri’s al‑Fatah bloc, backed by militias with close ties to Iran, also contested strongly.

In total, alliances competed for 329 federal seats in parliament. Yet the surprise outcome was the victory of the Sairoon Alliance, led by cleric Muqtada al‑Sadr, which secured the largest share of votes. Iraq’s electoral commission confirmed that Sairoon won 54 seats, followed by al‑Fatah with 48 and Abadi’s Nasr alliance with 42, as reported by BBC and Financial Times. This result meant that Iraqis had not delivered a clear‑cut mandate, leaving coalition negotiations inevitable.

Traditionally, the Iraqi prime minister must be acceptable to both the United States and Iran, reflecting the country’s geopolitical balancing act. Sadr’s rise was therefore striking. He had long criticised Iraqi politicians as ‘pawns of Ayatollahs’ and positioned himself against Iranian influence, which made his victory a shock for Tehran. In response, Iran dispatched Quds Force commander Qasim Soleimani to mobilise pro‑Iranian sentiment in Iraqi constituencies before the election, but his efforts failed to prevent Sadr’s bloc from emerging first, according to Reuters and Foreign Policy.

For Washington, Sadr’s success was paradoxical. Once a fierce opponent of US forces, he now represented a potential partner in stabilising Iraq. The New York Times observed that Sadr’s nationalist slogan ‘Iraq First’ resonated with the poor and working class, while his meetings with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signalled a willingness to engage with regional powers beyond Iran. Sadr also hinted at alliances with Haidar al‑Abadi, the British‑educated former prime minister who had cultivated ties with Tehran, suggesting that Abadi still had cards to play in coalition negotiations.

Government formation required 165 seats, but negotiations were complicated by allegations of fraud. Around 176 politicians accused the electoral commission of ‘bribery’ and ‘voter intimidation’, with Human Rights Watch and Middle East Eye documenting irregularities. Some called for a re‑election, but as political analyst Mustafa Saadoum explained, ‘the only solution available for political blocs is to pass a law in parliament cancelling the elections before the constitutional end of their term on June 30. The government can also appeal the parliament’s decision to the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq.’

Sadr’s support base came largely from Iraq’s poor. His past as a militia leader was notorious: black‑clad death squads under his command roamed Baghdad during the sectarian conflict, cleansing Sunni neighbourhoods and attacking US forces, often with weapons supplied from Tehran, according to Washington Post and International Crisis Group. Fear dominated daily life in Baghdad during those years. Yet in 2008, Sadr disbanded his militia and redirected his followers into social and political activities. He now presented himself as a reformist, drafting his manifesto with secular intellectuals and promising to fight corruption.

This transformation was significant. Once a firebrand cleric, Sadr now embraced populism. Al‑Monitor noted that he called for abolishing Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian quota system, advocating instead for institutions built on ‘qualification and integrity’ and staffed by technocrats. His supporters had stormed Baghdad’s Green Zone two years earlier to protest corruption, demonstrating his ability to mobilise mass movements. Though he did not run personally in the election and would not become prime minister, he was positioned as kingmaker in the new government.

The broader context remained volatile. Militias with independent chains of command continued to operate, believing that lawlessness could help them combat remnants of Islamic State. At the time, around 7,000 American troops were stationed in Iraq, though Pentagon figures acknowledged 5,200, mainly in advisory roles, according to CNN and New York Times. Iraq’s recent history had been scarred by the rise of Islamic State, which captured Mosul in 2014 after abandoned US military equipment and $500 million from Mosul’s Central Bank fell into its hands. The Iraqi army collapsed in the north, and IS fighters advanced along the Tigris Valley until Mosul was recaptured years later, as BBC and Washington Post reported.

Against this backdrop, the Sairoon Alliance represented a coalition of working‑class Shiites, Sunni businessmen, liberals, communists, social democrats and even anarchists. Their shared aim was to lift Iraq out of economic crisis and confront chronic unemployment and poverty. Analysts from The Economist and Financial Times argued that nationalism was rising while sectarianism was losing ground, though the fragile coalition likely to emerge would rest on minimum conditions and remain vulnerable to instability.

Violence from Islamic State, economic stagnation and corruption were the core issues that Sadr’s alliance promised to address. His populist appeal lay in pledges to reform governance, empower technocrats and reduce foreign interference. Yet the paradox remained: a former militia leader who once fought US troops now sought to ally with American‑led coalitions, while simultaneously resisting Iranian influence.

The May 2018 election thus encapsulated Iraq’s contradictions. It was hailed as a democratic milestone, yet marred by allegations of fraud. It produced a nationalist surge, yet left coalition politics fragile. It elevated a populist cleric with a violent past, yet offered hope of reform. As The Guardian concluded, Sadr’s victory was ‘a shock to Iran, a surprise to the United States, and a reminder that Iraq’s politics remain unpredictable.’