War in Syria

By Naveed Qazi | Editor, Globe Upfront

Syria’s civil war has been one of the most destructive conflicts of the twenty‑first century. By 2013, the Assad regime was already regaining ground in Latakia against rebels, but it was not until September 2015 that Russia formally launched its air campaign in Syria. As BBC News reported, Moscow’s intervention marked a turning point, enabling Assad’s forces to recapture rebel‑held areas with Russian air power and armour. 

The Syrian army, supported by Hezbollah and Iranian‑backed militias, pushed northwards towards the Turkish border, raising tensions with Ankara. 

As per Reuters, the Russian foreign ministry in Februrary 2016 insisted it had ‘not received convincing evidence of civilian deaths’ from its strikes, though humanitarian organisations and journalists such as Ibrahim Al‑Omar of Al Jazeera, who was killed while covering Russian raids in Idlib, documented widespread casualties.

Three actors — the Kurds, Assad’s loyalists, and Turkey — were central to the war’s shifting dynamics. The United States attempted to act as a mediator, urging restraint, but its influence waned. As Al Jazeera noted, the escalation between Russia and NATO powers after Crimea and eastern Ukraine led commentators to describe Syria as part of a ‘new cold war’. Russia sought to flank NATO, while Turkey feared direct confrontation with Moscow over Aleppo and Latakia. Many other reporters from Al Jazeera narrowly survived suspected Russian airstrikes in Idlib while covering civilian casualties, underscoring the dangers of Moscow’s campaign.

Turkey’s role was controversial. Analysts in 2017 cited by International Crisis Group argued that Ankara tolerated ISIS activity as a strategic tool against the Kurds, while avoiding a full‑scale invasion that would appear offensive. The siege of Kobani in 2014–15, described by PBS Frontline and CNN’s Ben Wedeman, saw ISIS raze villages and execute hundreds, forcing mass migration. Kobani’s pre‑war population of 300,000 swelled to 500,000 as refugees fled north. The Kurdish YPG, with US air support, eventually recaptured the city, but 70 per cent of it was destroyed, as BBC correspondents confirmed.

The Kurds, numbering more than two million in southern Turkey and northern Syria, sought autonomy in a region they call ‘Rojava’. They divided their territory into three cantons, promoting secularism and gender equality. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the YPG, ran local administrations, broadcasting Kurdish cultural programmes on television and radio. Schools and salaries remained funded by Damascus, but Kurdish militias controlled daily life. As the Council on Foreign Relations observed, Kurdish aspirations have long been rejected by Arab leaders, dating back to Syria’s independence in 1946. Scholars such as Vittoria Federici in The Rise of Rojava noted that the Syrian army’s withdrawal in 2012 allowed Kurdish militias to consolidate control.

ISIS retaliated with car bombs and suicide attacks, destabilising Rojava. Yet the Kurds took pride in their secular institutions and egalitarian ethos. Russia, recalling Soviet support for Kurdish movements in Iraq, later dispatched military advisers to Qamishli to secure an airport. President Putin, aided by Russian intelligence, attempted to broker deals with rebel groups, a task on which the Pentagon had spent billions but failed. Christoph Reuter of Der Spiegel emphasised that Assad’s battlefield successes since 2015 were not due to his weakened army but to Russian air power, Hezbollah, and Iranian‑backed militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

The Kurds played a double game, cooperating with both the United States and Russia. With US air support, they fought Daesh, while also engaging Moscow. Saudi Arabia joined the coalition against ISIS, aligning with Washington. This manoeuvring unsettled Ankara, where anti‑Kurdish sentiment ran deep. Peace talks in Riyadh between the Syrian government and opposition excluded the Kurds, reflecting Turkish pressure. Journalists from The Guardian noted that Ankara feared Kurdish autonomy more than ISIS, shaping its diplomatic stance.

Turkey, in 2016, as a strategic and security measure, demanded a no‑fly zone from Jarabulus to Azaz, the same area the Kurds sought to seize from ISIS. Turkish officials argued the zone would protect civilians from Assad’s air force. The Kurds saw it as a pretext for Turkey to bomb YPG fighters. Ankara’s contempt for Kurdish nationalism was longstanding. 

With time, Turkish artillery support in Aleppo and Latakia failed strategically, as Assad’s army and Hezbollah fighters held firm. By February 2016, Turkish armoured vehicles were entrenched along the border, building trenches and concrete walls, as Reuters correspondents observed.

Turkey also supplied weapons to anti‑Damascus militants, fuelling volatility such as Syrian National Army and Ahrar Al Sham. Christoph Reuter of Spiegel Online reported that Assad’s victories since 2015 were sustained by Russian air power and foreign militias rather than domestic strength. The United States, once focused on toppling Assad, shifted to dismantling ISIS. With 2,000 troops in eastern Syria working with the SDF, Washington lacked the diplomatic capacity to shape peace. Israel, on the other hand, exploited the war to strike Iranian targets, launching hundreds of airstrikes to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah. As The Hindu reported, Israel intensified strikes on Iranian‑linked targets in Syria, causing civilian casualties. TIME magazine’s Callum Sutherland noted that Israeli raids even hit Damascus, targeting Syrian defence infrastructure.

Civilians bore the brunt of the conflict. In Jisr al‑Shughur, one of the first battlegrounds, families sold homes and furniture to escape. Many fled with only what could fit on motorcycles or cars, as jets roared overhead. Medicines were transported through hostile territory from Damascus, and civil aviation remained under regime control. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated that by 2018 more than 360,000 people had died, while later figures suggested over 528,000 deaths. Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, warned that renewed fighting in Idlib could trigger mass displacement, echoing concerns raised by UN News.

The Kurds’ exclusion from peace talks underscored their precarious position. Ankara feared Kurdish autonomy more than ISIS, and its opposition blocked Kurdish participation in negotiations. The Kurds, however, continued to promote secularism and gender equality, distinguishing themselves from Islamist factions. Journalists such as Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, writing for CFR, highlighted the extraordinary role of Kurdish women fighters in resisting ISIS.

Ultimately, Syria’s war reflected the interplay of global powers. Russia sought to secure Assad’s regime and challenge NATO. Turkey manoeuvred to contain the Kurds while supporting rebels. The United States shifted focus to ISIS, abandoning broader ambitions. Israel struck Iranian targets, while Iran entrenched militias. The Kurds balanced between Washington and Moscow, seeking autonomy but facing hostility from Ankara. As Al Jazeera concluded, only a coherent peace process could stabilise Syria. Yet with fragmented opposition, entrenched foreign powers, and deep mistrust, peace remained elusive. The war weariness of Syrians was palpable, but the politics of the region continued to be shaped by external actors. Without compromise, Syria has been remaining a battlefield for proxy wars, with civilians paying the highest price.